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Abstract
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of a unionized econ-
omy to analyze the impact of unconditional basic income schemes on unemployment.
Starting from a given level of the unemployment bene¯ts, two reforms are envisaged :
one where these bene¯ts are replaced by a higher unconditional grant (the full basic
income) and another where the income of the unemployed remains unchanged (the
partial basic income). Assuming a proportional tax on earnings and a balanced bud-
get of the State, it is shown that the equilibrium unemployment rate decreases if a
partial basic income is implemented. The same conclusion holds for a su±ciently small
full basic income.
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11 Introduction
A basic or unconditional income consists of the payment of a grant to every adult citizen.
This idea has taken various forms and has received various names : social dividend (Lange,
1936, and Meade, 1989) and basic income (Parker, 1989, and Atkinson, 1995). The ethical
foundations of such a proposal have been developed at length (see, e.g., Van Parijs 1992,
Van Parijs, 1995). Yet, economists are often worried by the economic implications of
such a scheme. In the European context of high and persistent unemployment, it is in
particular justi¯ed to raise the question : What is the implication of a basic income on the
level of unemployment? It has been argued that the combination of a basic income and
a deregulated labor market could reconcile labor market e±ciency and income protection
(Standing, 1992). Whether a competitive outcome would emerge from a deregulated labor
market is an open question not raised in this paper. I assume the existence of unions with
a given bargaining power and analyze how the implementation of a basic income a®ects
the level of unemployment.
Two variants of the basic income proposal are considered in this paper : The pure form
of the scheme and a partial basic income. In the ¯rst case, henceforth called a full basic
income scheme, the unconditional grant replaces all social insurance and social assistance
bene¯ts for the population of working age. If the basic income has to be ¯nanced by the
income tax and if, for whatever reason, the highest marginal tax rates cannot be raised,
the initial and intermediate tax rates have to increase substantially in order to ¯nance a
reasonable basic income level. The political opposition to such a reform and uncertainties
about the behavior of economic agents when tax parameters are deeply modi¯ed have led
to proposals for a partial basic income (Parker, 1989). The unconditional grant is smaller
than in the ¯rst case. The social insurance and social assistance bene¯ts that are lower
than the basic income disappear and the others are in a way or another reduced by the
amount of the partial basic income.
2These two variants of the basic income proposal will be analyzed in a dynamic model
of collective bargaining developed by Manning (1991, 1993) and Cahuc and Zylberberg
(1996). The analysis will be developed in a general equilibrium setting with two factors,
labor and capital. The State levies a proportional tax on earnings and his budget has to
be balanced in each period. In this setting, imperfect competition on the labor market
causes unemployment. It is assumed that the unions' power and preferences and the un-
employment bene¯t system are exogenously given. The paper raises the question whether
the two variants of the basic income scheme are a way of ¯ghting unemployment or not.
This analysis does not have the ambition to provide a de¯nite answer to this question.
It nevertheless lead to rather clear-cut conclusions which should be checked in a richer
framework with heterogeneous workers and/or sectors, non linear taxation and the like.
The conclusions of this paper are as follows : (1) Compared to the case with an
unemployment insurance system but without basic income, the equilibrium unemployment
rate is always lower if a partial basic income scheme is implemented; the same holds if
the unemployment insurance system is abolished and replaced by a full basic income
scheme provided that the latter is su±ciently small; (2) the equilibrium unemployment
rate is a decreasing function of the level of the partial basic income; (3) the equilibrium
unemployment rate is an increasing function of the level of the full basic income if workers
are risk averse; (4) the equilibrium tax wedge increases with the level of the basic income
schemes while the net wage rate decreases; (5) introducing a su±ciently small partial basic
income can be a Pareto improvement.
The literature on the macroeconomic e®ects of a basic income is not much developed
so far. As far as I know, the literature is only concerned with the so-called full basic
income scheme. Bowles (1992) focuses on the relationship between a universal grant and
work e®ort. He concludes that a small unconditional grant can be introduced without
reducing the pre-grant level of pro¯ts. The main mechanism behind this result is that
the grant lowers the workers' fall-back position. Atkinson (1995) analyses the switch from
3unemployment bene¯ts ¯nanced by a payroll tax to a basic income scheme and a °at
income tax. He shows that this reform reduces the unemployment and wage levels in a
dual labor market. Yet, this conclusion appears to depend on the institutional features of
the unemployment bene¯t system. In a ¯x-price model, K¶ esenne (1991) explains that a
basic income helps to clear the labor market through a reduction of labor supply. K¶ esenne
(1993) develops a static macro model where output prices are exogenously ¯xed and wages
are the outcome of an e±cient bargain. His results emphasize the roles of labor supply
responses and of fall-back positions in the bargaining process.
This paper is organized as follows. To provide insight into the main e®ects of a basic
income on wage bargaining, section 2 proposes a simple partial equilibrium and static
model. Section 3 presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a unionized economy.
Starting from the latter model, section 4 develops the main comparative static results
about the e®ect of a basic income on unemployment. Section 5 presents a numerical
example and section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A static model in partial equilibrium
Assume a ¯rm with a quasi-Cobb-Douglas technology (AL)® where L denotes the homo-
geneous labor factor, A is a positive parameter and 0 <®<1. Assume also perfect
competition on the goods market. Let w be the net real wage and ¿ the exogenous tax






















Workers are endowed with a utility function v(R), where R denotes net real income,
v0(R) > 0a n dv 00(R) · 0. The working time is exogenous and normalized to one. The
utility of an employed worker is v(w + B), where B is the unconditional basic income
(B ¸ 0). The utility of an unemployed, vu, is di®erent depending on whether the full or
4the partial basic income scheme applies. The partial basic income is such that vu = v(Z),
where Z is the level of real unemployment bene¯ts, for Z is reduced by the amount of
the partial basic income, while the unemployed, as any other adult citizen, receives the
partial basic income. So, his net real income is Z. The full basic income scheme replaces
unemployment bene¯ts, so that now vu = v(B). To facilitate the comparison between these
two variants, it is assumed that the level of Z is exogenously given (Z>0). Moreover a
full basic income scheme is by assumption such that B is higher than Z. To sum up, in
this analysis, the utility of an unemployed is de¯ned as
vu =
(
v(Z)i f Z>B>0 (partial basic income scheme)
v(B)i f B ¸ Z>0 (full basic income scheme).
(3)
These assumptions o®er a clear distinction between the two variants. Yet, they preclude
any evaluation of the case where the unemployment bene¯t system is abolished and re-
placed by a full but low basic income scheme (i.e. Z>B>0 but vu = v(B)). Moreover,
one could perfectly well imagine that a full basic income be implemented simultaneously
with an unemployment insurance scheme. The pros and cons of such a combination are
not discussed in this paper.
Following Manning (1991, 1993), assume that the union adopts the following objective
function :
V = LÃ(v(w + B) ¡ vg); (4)
where Ã is a nonnegative parameter representing "union's preferences for employment
relative to wages" (Manning, 1993, p.101). It is typically assumed that Ã 2 [0;1]. vg is
the outside option or more precisely "some measure of the value of alternatives available
elsewhere in the economy to workers who lose their jobs in this ¯rm" (Manning, 1993, p.
100-101). Hence, in this static partial equilibrium setting, let vg = vu de¯ned above.
Assume that the ¯rm decides upon the employment level (the right-to-manage assump-
tion) and that w is set to maximize a Nash product (¼ ¡ ¼0)1¡°(V¡V 0) ° where ° is the
so-called bargaining power of the union (° 2 [0;1]). The fall-back positions of the union
5and the ¯rm (¼0;V0) are assumed to be zero1. Remembering the labor demand and pro¯t









Assume the usual hypothesis according to which the level of the unemployment bene¯t
is independent of the negotiated wage rate in a particular ¯rm. Extend this assumption
to the basic income. The ¯rst-order condition of problem (5) can then be formulated as
follows :
v(w + B) ¡ vu
wv0(w +B)




The second-order condition is satis¯ed if ¹<1 or, equivalently, °(1 ¡ Ã) <® . This is
always true if the union has a utilitarian objective (Ã = 1). In a seniority model (Ã =0 ) ,
the condition ¹<1 imposes an upper-bound on the union's bargaining power. Henceforth,
the condition ¹<1 is assumed to hold. ¹ is smaller the higher the absolute values of the
elasticities of pro¯ts and labor demand with respect to the real wage rate (respectively,
®
1¡® and 1
1¡®). ¹ is also smaller the higher the union's relative preference for employment,
Ã.
The analysis of the e®ect of the basic income on employment is straightforward in this
partial equilibrium setting. If an increase in B lowers the wage rate w, labor demand
increases and so does employment (assuming no labor supply constraint). Therefore the
analysis will now focus on the sign of @w
@B. Let us start with the partial basic income policy
(i.e. vu = v(Z)). In equation (6), as B increases, v(w+B)¡vu increases too for any value
of w. In addition, v0(w + B) decreases if workers are risk averse or stays constant if they
are risk neutral. Hence, the ratio on the left-hand side of equality (6) increases. To keep





(1 ¡ ¹)v0(w + B) ¡ ¹v00(w + B)
< ¡1: (7)
1As in Manning (1991), this means that the inside and the outside options are assumed to be equal.
6This partial equilibrium result implies that introducing a partial basic income or increasing
it has a favorable impact on the employment level.
The intuition behind this conclusion is easily grasped. Equation (5) implies that an
increase in the partial basic income compensated by an identical decrease in the net wage
does not change the rent v(w+B)¡vu of a union member. Yet, the reduction in wage will
enhance labor demand and pro¯ts. So, a more than proportional wage cut can typically
be expected. Notice that in this partial equilibrium setting there is no di®erence between
a partial basic income and a wage subsidy paid to each employee.
Let us now turn to the full basic income policy. The optimal condition (6) applies
here too if vu is now interpreted as v(B). If workers are risk neutral, v(w + B) ¡ v(B)
stays constant whatever the value of B. Put di®erently, the wage rate is not modi¯ed by
the presence of a basic income. However, if workers are risk averse, the numerator of (6)
decreases with B. So does the denominator. Hence, the net e®ect is in general ambiguous.
It can be checked that @w

















Put another way, in a partial equilibrium setting, a full basic income can favor wage
moderation only if workers are su±ciently risk averse.
3 A dynamic model in general equilibrium
This section intends to verify whether the previous results carry over in a more comprehen-
sive model of a unionized economy. A dynamic general equilibrium model with identical
agents is developed. This model draws upon chapter 8 of Cahuc and Zylberberg (1996),
henceforth CZ. The model of CZ itself is inspired by Manning (1991,1993) and Layard
and Nickell (1990). There is implicitly an international ¯nancial market with perfect mo-
bility. The economy is assumed to be a small one which faces an exogenous interest rate
r. The basic income and unemployment bene¯ts are ¯nanced by a proportional tax on
7earnings. The budget of the State is assumed to balance in each period. I keep the hy-
pothesis according to which the levels of the unemployment bene¯t and the basic income
are independent of the negotiated wage rate in a particular ¯rm.
3.1 Assumptions and notations
Assume a deterministic setting with, in each period t, n identical ¯rms, N homogeneous
workers and M inactive individuals entitled to a basic income. Each of the n ¯rm owners
bargains over wages with a ¯rm-speci¯c union. The former decides unilaterally on em-
ployment and on the level of investment. Firms and workers are in¯nitely lived agents
with perfect foresight. In a given period t, the sequence of decisions is as follows :
1. At the beginning of the period, a bargaining over the current wage level takes place
in each ¯rm (wages are only set for one period). If an agreement is reached, the
employees (whose number is de¯ned at stage 2) receives each a net real wage wt at
the end of period t.
2. In ¯rms where there is a collective agreement, the ¯rm determines labor demand and
the investment level for the current period. Given wt, the employment level is ¯xed
by labor demand and production occurs. Without an agreement at stage 1, nothing
is produced during the current period. Yet, the ¯rm will have the opportunity to
bargain and to hire workers (without hiring costs) in t +1 .
3. The tax wedge is adjusted for the current period in order to balance the public
budget constraint.
4. At the end of the period, an exogenous fraction q of the employees leaves the ¯rm
and enters unemployment2.
2The following comment of Layard and Nickell (1990) (p.780) applies here, too :
In reality, of course, turnover is also generated by exogenous demand shocks of various kinds.
This is ignored here, since we do not wish to introduce such explicit stochastic elements into
the model. However, we feel that our model will mimic closely the consequences of a stochastic
(...) model.
8Firms
To simplify the exposition, the n ¯rms produce a homogeneous good and sell it on a
competitive market. The output price is normalized to 1. All ¯rms are assumed to be
identical. To save on notation, no subscript will be added to identify a particular ¯rm.
When it determines labor demand and the investment level, each ¯rm takes as given the
(constant) interest rate r and the (constant) depreciation rate ± (± 2 [0;1]). At this stage,
each ¯rm takes also the real wage cost, wt(1 + ¿t), as given (by assumption, a particular
¯rm is small and cannot in°uence the tax wedge ¿t).
In period t, given the initial capital stock Kt, each ¯rm chooses its investment level It,
such that Kt+1 =( 1¡± ) K t+I t. Let Lt denote labor demanded by the ¯rm. Assume a
Cobb-Douglas technology with constant returns to scale : (ALt)®K1¡®
t ;A>0. In period









t ¡ wt(1 + ¿t)Lt ¡ (Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt)]: (9)












= ± + r; 8t ¸ 0: (11)
Given Kt, equation (10) determines Lt as a function of wt and ¿t. The capital stock Kt+1,
and the investment level It, are derived from equation (11), as a function of the next
period employment level Lt+1.
In t = 0, the capital stock is ¯xed and equation (10) de¯nes a downward-sloping labor
demand curve. For t ¸ 1, given the constant returns to scale assumption, the input
demand functions are not well de¯ned by equations (10) and (11). Only the capital-labor
ratio Kt
Lt is de¯ned. Moreover equations (10) and (11) evaluated respectively at time t
and t ¡ 1 determine the wage cost at time t as a function of the structural parameters of
9problem (9). This relationship is actually a real input prices frontier3. It writes :







This equation means that the wage cost is exogenously ¯xed by the structural parameters
characterizing the ¯rm and the economy (e.g., the interest rate r). A similar property
would have hold if we had assumed imperfectly competitive ¯rms facing an isoelastic de-
mand curve for their output (see CZ, p. 487-490). Yet, the perfect competition hypothesis
implies that the level of output supplied by the ¯rm is here indeterminate. Therefore, the
bargaining over wages described below will actually determine the unemployment level,
from which the output level can be derived.
Let ¼t be current pro¯ts net of investment, i.e. ¼t = maxLt((ALt)®K1¡®
t ¡wt(1+¿t)Lt).















Discounted pro¯ts at time t, ¦t, are de¯ned as
¦t = ¼t ¡ It + ¯¦t+1: (14)
where ¯ = 1
1+r is the discount factor (¯ 2 ]0;1[).
Workers
Each of the N homogeneous workers supplies one unit of labor. His instantaneous
utility function is v(Rt);v0 > 0;v00 < 0, where Rt denotes net real income in period t
(by assumption, there is no saving). Notice that with such a speci¯cation neither the
unemployment bene¯t nor the basic income can in°uence labor supply. Hence, the size of
the labor force will be exogenous.
At the end of period t, each employee leaves the ¯rm with an exogenous probability q,
q 2 ]0;1[. He is then unemployed at the beginning of period t + 1 and will be hired by a
3The constant returns to scale assumption implies that the long-run marginal production cost is con-
stant. The ¯rm is ready to supply any amount of output provided that the output price is equal to the
marginal cost. This equality can be rewritten as a real input prices frontier.
10¯rm with probability at+1
4. Hence, in period t, the intertemporal discounted utility of a
job in the ¯rm, V t
e, is given by the following expression :
V t
e = v(wt + Bt)+¯ f q [ a t +1V t+1
e +( 1¡a t +1)V t+1
u ]+( 1 ¡ q ) V t +1
e g; (15)
where Bt denotes the level of the basic income at time t, V t+1
e is the intertemporal dis-
counted utility of a job on average in the economy in period t + 1 and V t+1
u is the in-
tertemporal discounted utility of being unemployed in t +1 . Vt +1
e is of the same form as
(15) with only one di®erence : The average net real wage in the economy, wt, replaces wt.
The intertemporal discounted utility of being unemployed at time t, V t
u,i sg i v e nb y
Vt
u=v t
u+¯ f a t +1V t+1
e +( 1¡a t +1)V t+1
u g; (16)
where vt
u = v(Zt) with a partial basic income and vt
u = v(Bt) with a full basic income.
Wage-setting
Following Manning (1991, 1993), assume that the ¯rm-speci¯c union adopts the fol-




e ¡ V t
g); (17)
where Ã has the same meaning as in section 2. Redundant workers are assumed to be
immediately rehired in another ¯rm with probability at. Hence,
V t
g = atV t
e +( 1¡a t) Vt
u: (18)
The objective function (17) is fairly general. It should however be noticed that it simpli¯es
drastically the analysis of the intertemporal model, for the time-dependent size of the union
does not appear in (17) (compare, e.g., with Huizinga and Schiantarelli, 1992).
Assume that the current real wage wt is set to maximize a Nash product. As in
section 2, the fall-back position of the union is assumed to be zero. As argued by CZ
(p. 470-471), in the absence of an agreement, nothing is produced but future pro¯ts and,
4Workers move freely from one ¯rm to another.
11hence, investment are not a®ected. It has indeed be assumed that the ¯rm will have the
opportunity to bargain and to hire workers (without hiring costs) in t+1. Hence, the ¯rm's
component in the Nash product, i.e., the di®erence between intertemporal discounted
pro¯ts in case of an agreement, ¦t, and in the absence of an agreement, ¡It + ¯¦t+1,i s











where ° is the so-called bargaining power of the union. The tax wedge ¿t does not appear
in (19) because the players take it as given. The ¯rst-order condition of this problem can
be written as
V t
e ¡ V t
g = ¹wtv0(wt + Bt); (20)
where ¹ has been de¯ned in equation (6). The second-order condition is satis¯ed if ¹<1
(about this requirement, see section 2).
3.2 The equilibrium
In the initial period (t = 0), this economy is characterized by an aggregate labor demand
curve (derived from (10)), the wage-setting equation (20) and by the budget constraint of
the State. For t ¸ 1, this economy is fully characterized by the real input prices frontier
(12) and by the same wage-setting equation and balanced budget constraint.
The wage-setting equations
Since all ¯rms and unions' characteristics are identical, at an equilibrium, wt = wt and
V t
e = V t
e. Then (18) implies that
V t
e ¡ V t
g =( 1¡a t)(V t
e ¡ V t
u): (21)
From (15) and (16), it can be seen that
V t
e ¡ V t
u = v(wt + Bt) ¡ vt
u + ¯(1 ¡ q)(V t+1
e ¡ V t+1
g ): (22)
12Combining (20), (21) and (22) leads to the following expression :
v(wt + Bt) ¡ vt
u
¹wtv0(wt + Bt)









In this equality, the ¯rst component of the left-hand side has already been met in the
static model of section 2. In equation (6), its optimal level was equal to one. This is no
more the case in the dynamic setting essentially because of the separation rate q.
The right-hand-side of (23) can be rewritten as a function of the current and previous
unemployment rate. For the current unemployment level is made of those who where
unemployed at the beginning of this period and who are not currently hired. The former
group is made of those who were unemployed in period t ¡ 1 and those who entered
unemployment at the end of the same period. After division by the size of the labor force,
N, this de¯nition writes
ut =( 1¡a t)(q +( 1¡q) u t ¡ 1) ; (24)
where ut is the unemployment rate in period t. Substituting (1 ¡ at) from this equation
into (23) leads to an implicit wage equation where the current net real wage rate is a
function of the current and past unemployment rate, the anticipated wage rate in t +1
and the current and anticipated levels of the allowances (B and, where appropriate, Z).
The case of a constant relative risk aversion utility function







ln(Rt) ¸ =0 .
(25)
Moreover, I assume that the replacement ratio is constant and exogenous in each pe-
riod t (Zt
wt = z;z 2 ]0;1[)5 and that the basic income is proportional to the level of the
unemployment bene¯t (Bt = »Zt;»¸0). Let
I(»)=
(
» if » ¸ 1 (the full basic income case)
1i f »<1 (the partial basic income case).
(26)
5This assumption is supported by Figure 2.2 in OECD (1996).















q +( 1¡q) u t ¡ 1
u t
(27)
if ¸ 6= 0. This curve will be called the 'WS' curve. If ¸ = 0, the wage-setting equation









+ ¯(1 ¡ q)=
q+( 1¡q) u t ¡ 1
u t
: (28)
The budget constraint of the State
The budget of the State is assumed to be balanced in each period. This budget
constraint is di®erent whether the partial or the full basic income applies. It is also
in°uenced by the degree of eligibility of the inactive population. Various assumptions
could be made here. However, the theoretical analysis can stay fairly general. Let º be
the sum of the n ¯rm owners and the size M of the (eligible) inactive population divided
by the workforce (º = n+M




Z tu t+B t(1 ¡ ut + º) if a partial basic income applies








1¡ut + »(1 + º
1¡ut)
´
if a partial basic income applies
»z 1+º
1¡ut if a full basic income applies.
(30)
It can easily be checked that the tax wedge increases with the unemployment rate.
In the initial period (t = 0), the de¯nition of the tax wedge can be combined with the
aggregate labor demand curve. Starting from equation (10), this curve can be written as
a static upward-sloping relationship between the unemployment rate and the real wage










14where K0 designates the aggregate capital stock (K0 = nK0). The balanced budget
equations can be used to eliminate ¿0 from the labor demand curve (31). This yields the
following relationships between the net real wage rate w0 and the unemployment rate u0 :
w0 =
8
> > > <
> > > :
Át
(1¡u0)®
(1¡u0)+zu0+»z(1¡u0+º) if a partial basic income applies,
Át
(1¡u0)®
(1¡u0)+»z(1+º) if a full basic income applies,





, Á0 > 0:
(32)
This is nothing else than the so-called 'price-setting curve' PS extended to take the budget
constraint of the State into account. Hence, this curve will be called the 'extended PS'
curve. It can be checked that the curves (32) cut the vertical axis at w0 =
Á0
1+»z(1+º) > 0
and the horizontal one at u0 = 1. The slope of these curves can be positive for small
values of u0 (if a reduction in employment increases marginal productivity su±ciently)
but it necessarily becomes negative as u0 increases. In the partial basic income case, it
can be seen that the curve (32) is monotonically decreasing for plausible values of the
parameters.
For t ¸ 1, the de¯nition of the tax wedge can be combined with the real input prices
frontier (12) in order to generate a relationship between the net wage rate and the unem-






1+»z(1+º)¡(1+(»¡1)z)ut if a partial basic income applies
C(1¡ut)
1+»z(1+º)¡ut if a full basic income applies.
(33)
It can easily be checked that in both cases this curve is downward-sloping and concave.
Moreover, it cuts the vertical axis at wt = C
1+»z(1+º) > 0 and the horizontal one at ut =1 .
The symmetric equilibrium
This economy is fully characterized by the wage-setting equation (27) or (28) and the
'extended PS curve' (32) if t = 0 and (33) for t ¸ 1. The emphasis will be put on the
latter case but let us ¯rst brie°y look at the initial period. If ¸ 6= 0, conditional on w1
and u¡1, @w0
@u0 has the same sign as ¸ (see (27)). Therefore, according to this sign and the
shape of the 'extended PS curve' (32), the initial period equilibrium can be unique or not,
15conditional on w1 and u¡1.I f¸= 0, equation (28) directly determines u0 conditional on
u¡1. The equilibrium in t = 0 is then unique.
For t ¸ 1, if ¸ = 0, the dynamics of the economy is quite simple. Equation (28) imme-
diately provides a relationship between the current unemployment rate and the previous
one. Appendix 1 proves the stability of this ¯rst-order dynamic equation. In the more
general case (¸ 6= 0), the ratio
wt+1
wt in equation (27) can be derived from equation (33)
(evaluated at times t and t + 1). After some manipulation, equation (27) becomes then a
second-order scalar nonlinear di®erence equation where the current unemployment rate ut
is a function of the lagged unemployment level ut¡1 and the future one ut+1. Appendix 1
shows that this dynamic system is stable and that the equilibrium is a saddle point. Let
us now concentrate on the steady state. In such a state, the unemployment rate stays con-
stant. So does the tax wedge (see (30)) and the net real wage rate (see (33)). Therefore,
the wage-setting equations de¯ne the equilibrium unemployment rate u¤. From (27) and



















zI(»))¡(1¡¯)(1¡q) if ¸ =0
(34)
Section 4 will analyze the properties of the equilibrium unemployment rate. Knowing
u¤, the steady state tax wedge and net real wage rate are easily computed from, respec-
tively, (30) and (33). Figure 1 illustrates this solution. The equilibrium (w¤;u ¤)i sa tt h e
intersection of a vertical line 'WS' (34) and a downward-sloping 'extended PS' curve (33).
To sum up, in this model where the interest rate is exogenous, the real wage cost is
exogenously ¯xed along the the real input prices frontier. The union-¯rm bargaining over
the net real wage eventually plays the role of de¯ning the equilibrium unemployment rate
and, hence, the equilibrium aggregate output level. For this unemployment rate, the net
real wage is read along the 'extended PS curve'. This implies that the net real wage rate
accommodates any change in the tax rate induced by °uctuations in unemployment.
16INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
4 Comparative static analysis
This section analyzes the e®ect of the exogenous parameters on the equilibrium unemploy-
ment rate. It is essentially concerned with the impact of the basic income schemes on the
equilibrium unemployment rate, net wage and tax wedge. To avoid clutter, no superscript
is added to indicate that the endogenous variables are at their equilibrium level. This
section only deals with the case of an iso-elastic instantaneous utility function (25). Due
to space limitations, it focusses on the case ¸ 6=0 .
The equilibrium unemployment rate is strictly bounded between zero and one (see
appendix 2). Moreover, as usual in this type of model, the levels of wages and unem-
ployment depend crucially on unions' bargaining power and preferences and on the wage
elasticities of pro¯t and labor demand functions on the one hand and on the replacement
ratio on the other hand (see, e.g., Layard, Nickell and Jackman, 1991). The following
result summarizes some standard properties (the proof is left to appendix 2).
Result 1 The equilibrium unemployment rate is an increasing function of the interest
rate r, the separation rate q, the mark-up ¹ and the replacement ratio z. On the contrary,
the equilibrium unemployment rate is lower the more relative risk averse workers are.
Let us now turn to the main results of this paper.
Result 2 Compared to the case with an unemployment insurance system but without ba-
sic income, the equilibrium unemployment rate is always lower if a partial basic income
scheme is implemented. The same holds if the unemployment insurance system is abol-
ished and replaced by a full basic income scheme if the ratio between the basic income and
the unemployment bene¯t, » (»>1 ), is lower than 1+ z
1 ¡ z, where z is the replacement
ratio.
17Let uz denote the equilibrium unemployment rate when there is an unemployment insur-




¹¸ (1 ¡ z¸) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q)
:


























The latter condition is veri¯ed if 1 + »z > I(»). The last inequality is always satis¯ed in
the case of a partial basic income (0 <»<1 ; I ( » ) = 1). With a full basic income, the
same conclusion holds if » is not too high (1 · »<1+ z
1 ¡ z).










in (34) is a particular case of the ratio
v(w+B)¡vu
¹wv0(w+B), which was ¯rst introduced in the static
model of section 2. As can be seen from (35), the basic income a®ects the equilibrium
unemployment rate through two channels : the term 1 + »z and the generalized replace-
ment ratio
zI(»)
1+»z. The literature about wage-setting in the presence of a non linear tax
system (Lockwood and Manning (1993)) clari¯es the mechanism behind the ¯rst channel.
According to this literature, an increase in the progressivity of taxation, loosely speaking,
acts as an incentive for wage moderation. Similarly, CZ have shown that an increase in
progressivity decreases the equilibrium unemployment rate. This result applies here, too.
Whereas the tax wedge is constant, the net real income of the workers, Rt = wt + Bt,
can be rewritten as wt ¡ T(wt;B t), where T is the amount of taxes incident upon the
18employee net of all bene¯ts (here, T(wt;B t)=¡ B t ). Hence, the so-called coe±cient of





. Since this expression is lower than 1, taxes net of the basic income can be
said to be progressive6. Moreover, the higher B, the more progressive the system is. To
sum up, the basic income has a favorable e®ect on the equilibrium unemployment level
partly because it introduces some progressivity in taxation.
The following proposition deals with the slope of the relationship between the steady
state unemployment rate and the magnitude of the basic income. From (34), it is clear
that the sign of @u
@» is given by the sign of the partial derivative of (35). Therefore, the
next result is closely connected to those presented in the partial equilibrium setting of
section 2.
Result 3 The equilibrium unemployment rate and net wage rate decrease with the level
of the partial basic income. The equilibrium unemployment rate increases with (resp., is
independent of) the level of the full basic income if workers are risk averse (resp., risk
neutral). The equilibrium net wage rate decreases with the level of the full basic income.
One has simply to carry out the ¯rst-order partial derivative of (34) with respect to »














where D is the denominator of (34). The expression between brackets is strictly positive





< 1. When ¸ is negative, the
expression between brackets is negative. Therefore the whole expression is negative, too.
















6The hypothesis according to which the levels of the unemployment bene¯t and the basic income are
independent of the negotiated wage rate in a particular ¯rm plays here a crucial role.
19Here the term between brackets is zero if ¸ = 1. On the contrary when 0 <¸<1, this
expression is negative. The latter conclusion can be checked by numerical simulation for
0 <z<1, 0 <¸<1 and for plausible values of » (say, 1 · » · 2). For su±ciently
negative values of ¸, the term between brackets is positive. Hence, @u
@» is positive, too.
Numerical simulations shows that the same is true when ¸ is negative but close to zero. The
unambiguous sign of expression (36) is not in accordance with the equivalent expression
in section 2 (see (8)). There, for su±ciently risk averse workers, the full basic income had
a favorable e®ect on employment. It can be checked that the sign of (36) can become
negative with a more general utility function than the isoelastic one. Yet, whether an
equilibrium exists in such a case remains an open question.
As far as the net wage rate is concerned, it can easily be checked that @wt
@» · 0 along the
'extended PS' curve (see (33)). Therefore, the equilibrium net wage rate decreases with
».
Figure 2 illustrates the e®ect of an increase in » on the equilibrium unemployment
and net wage rates. The bold face curves represent the 'WS' and 'extended PS' curves
after an increase in ». As a corollary, the negative sign of @wt
@» at the equilibrium implies
that the equilibrium tax wedge increases with » (remember that the wage cost is actually
exogenous and independent of »).
INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
The previous results can be rephrased in a clear-cut qualitative message. Three sen-
tences summarize this message. (1) If, for whatever reason, the unions' power and pref-
erences and the replacement ratio are given, the introduction of a partial basic income
lowers the equilibrium unemployment rate. (2) Moreover, if this policy is implemented,
the highest possible partial basic income is recommended if the reduction of the unemploy-
ment rate is the unique government's goal. (3) However, this policy implies an increase in
the tax wedge.
20No discussion of the pros and cons of a basic income proposal is complete without at
least a rough estimation of its main e®ects. As a ¯rst step towards this requirement, the
next section presents a numerical example based on plausible values of the parameters. In
addition, this section will illustrate that the introduction of a partial basic income can be
a Pareto improvement.
5 A numerical example
In this section, I calibrate the model using some plausible assumptions for the parameters
and focus on the steady state values of unemployment and taxation. This information
is insu±cient to advocate or not the reform under concern. Therefore, I will close this
section with a brief welfare analysis.
Since wages are by assumption determined for one period, each period is assumed to
last a year. The example is built upon the following values for the parameters : ® =
0:7;° =0 : 6 ;Ã = 0, hence ¹ =0 : 64;¸ = ¡1;¯ =0 : 95;º =0 : 1 ;q =0 : 2a n dz=0 : 4.
In other words, the bargaining is modelled as the maximization of an asymmetric Nash
product and the unions do not value the level of employment7. The assumption º =0 : 1
means that, on average in the EU, about one-quarter of the inactive population aged 18-64
would be eligible for a basic income. Considering only the population aged 18-64 stems
from the focus of this paper on the unemployment insurance mechanism8. Moreover, it is
assumed that some participation criteria restrict eligibility. In this context, the assumption
of an eligibility rate of 25% is simply an example. However, remember that º in°uences
only the tax wedge and that the magnitude of the latter has no e®ect on the unemployment
rate under the assumptions behind (34). The value of the separation rate q is in accordance
with the results of Burda and Wyplosz (1994). z =0 : 4 is an hypothesis that could be
7The assumption Ã = 0 is in accordance with the so-called seniority model. Moreover, su±ciently close
to the steady state, each union member is certain to keep his job since new hirings should compensate the
number of quits that occurred at the end of the previous period. Hence, the assumption Ã = 0 is plausible
in the neighborhood of the steady state.
8Other components of the Welfare State such as state pensions and family bene¯ts have been left aside.
21supported by the results provided in OECD (1996)9.
Figure 3 illustrates results 2 and 3. The equilibrium unemployment rate is highest in
the absence of a basic income, it decreases as a function of », reaches its minimum when
the basic income equals the level of the unemployment bene¯t and then starts increasing.
The relative decrease in the equilibrium unemployment rate is large (from about 9% when
» = 0 to less than 4% when » = 1). It should be added that unreported numerical
simulations indicate that the unemployment rate varies monotonically along the dynamic
path between two equilibria.
Figure 3 also shows that the tax wedge ¿ is nearly proportional to ». The wedge is
about 15% when » equals 0.3 (i.e. a basic income-net wage ratio of 12%). In addition
to the tax wedge, it is interesting to have a look at the average tax rate (in the case of
an occupied worker), µ, de¯ned by the equality B + w =( 1¡µ ) w (1 + ¿) with B = »zw.
Hence, µ =1¡
1+»z
1+¿ . As Figure 3 shows, µ is a slightly increasing function of ».I t
amounts to 3.5% when » equals 0.3. These results raise the issue of the trade-o® between
unemployment and the tax rate. A traditional argument against any basic income scheme
is that the large increase in the tax wedge implied by this policy outweighs its advantages.
This paper only deals with one of them, namely the reduction in the unemployment rate.
There is therefore no claim that this analysis de¯nitely clari¯es this issue.
INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to notice that the introduction of a partial basic income
is a Pareto improvement in this example if the ratio » is su±ciently low (» · 0:3). There
is no claim that this property applies for a large range of values of the parameters. Yet,
the fact that this reform can be a Pareto improvement is as such a valuable result.
This economy is ex post made of four types of agents (¯rm-owners, the inactive popu-
lation, the occupied workers and the unemployed). It is easily seen that the steady state
9It turns out to be a bit higher than the Belgian aggregate net replacement ratio at the beginning of
the nineties (see Dor, Van der Linden and Lopez-Novella, 1997).
22value of pro¯ts is zero. Hence, if ¯rm owners are eligible to the basic income, their intertem-
poral utility becomes positive thanks to this grant (otherwise it remains unchanged). The
same is true for those in the inactive population. Things are less obvious for the two other
categories. From (15), (20) and (21), it can be veri¯ed that the steady state intertemporal
utilities of respectively an occupied worker and an unemployed are given by :
Ve =































Neglecting the scaling factor C¸, Figure 4 illustrates these formula. This ¯gure assumes
the values of the parameters indicated at the beginning of this section. It shows that both
Ve and Vu increase as long as » is small. For higher values of », Ve still increases but at a
slowing rate. Ve reaches a maximum for » = 1. As far as Vu is concerned, it reaches a local
maximum about » =0 : 3 and it starts increasing again when a full basic income replaces
the partial scheme (the immediate e®ect on income outweighs the reduction in the hiring
rate).
INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE.
6 Conclusion
The economics of basic income schemes has often been reduced to an arithmetic exercise
or it has focussed on labor supply in a competitive setting. This paper departs from
these viewpoints and analyzes the wage and employment e®ects of such a scheme in static
and dynamic models of collective bargaining. In European countries at least, the latter
assumption is much more plausible than the competitive one.
I have considered two variants of the basic income proposal. In the ¯rst case, called the
full basic income scheme, the unconditional grant replaces all social insurance and social
assistance bene¯ts for the population of working age. In the second case, called a partial
23basic income, the bene¯ts that are lower than the basic income disappear while the others
are reduced by the amount of the partial basic income. The analysis has assumed that an
unemployment insurance system initially exists and it has ignored the other components
of the social security and assistance systems. The level of the unemployment bene¯ts was
taken as given. The analysis has concentrated on reforms that either leave the net income
of the unemployed unchanged (the partial scheme) or improves it (the full scheme). Yet,
the model developed in this paper is probably also a useful framework for the proponents
of the view that a basic income should both replace all social security bene¯ts and be
lower than the latter.
To ease the understanding of the e®ect of a basic income on wage bargaining, this
paper has ¯rst developed a partial equilibrium and static framework. This simple model
has afterwards been embedded in a dynamic general equilibrium setting. The analysis ends
with a number of strong predictions. First, compared to the case with an unemployment
insurance system but without basic income, the equilibrium unemployment rate is always
lower if a partial basic income scheme is implemented. The same holds if the unemployment
insurance system is abolished and replaced by a full basic income scheme provided that
the ratio between the basic income and the unemployment bene¯t is su±ciently small.
Second, the equilibrium unemployment rate is a decreasing function of the level of the
partial basic income. Third, the equilibrium unemployment rate is an increasing function
of the level of the full basic income if workers are risk averse. Fourth, the equilibrium
tax wedge increases with the level of the basic income while the net wage rate decreases.
Finally, introducing a su±ciently small partial basic income can be a Pareto improvement.
This paper has abstracted from many important features of a basic income proposal.
First, agents were assumed to be identical. It is true that ex post some of them were
unemployed and some others not. But many income redistribution issues have been left
aside. Nor has this paper dealt with the e®ect of a basic income on poverty, the degree
of dependency on means-tested bene¯ts or the pattern of power and dependency within
24families. Second, the instantaneous utility function was assumed to be a function of income
only. Third, economic agents took their decision in a deterministic and full information
setting. Consequently, any con°ict between employers and employees about the level of
e®ort of the latter was ruled out. Finally, this paper has neglected administrative costs
and oversimpli¯ed institutional features (e.g. those of the unemployment bene¯t system).
These shortcomings and possibly others suggest interesting ways to pursue this line of
analysis one step further.
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Appendix 1
This appendix deals with the dynamic properties of the equilibrium, with a focus on
unemployment. It is organized as follows. First, it brie°y deals with the case ¸ =0 .
Secondly, under the assumption ¸ 6= 0, it shows that the dynamic behavior of this economy
can be represented by a second-order scalar nonlinear di®erence equation where the current
unemployment rate ut is a function of the lagged unemployment rate ut¡1 and the future
one ut+1. Thirdly, it analyzes the properties of this di®erence equation.
When the utility function v(Rt) = ln(Rt), i.e. ¸ =0
The dynamics of the economy is here quite simple. Equation (28) immediately pro-
vides a relationship between the current unemployment rate and the previous one. This
relationship can be rewritten as





















¡(1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q) > 0:
25This condition imposes that the equilibrium unemployment rate be positive (see (34)).
This is the case for plausible values of the parameters.
The dynamic system when ¸ 6=0
Here, the utility function is v(Rt)=
R ¸
t
¸.F o rt¸1, the ratio
wt+1
wt in equation (27) can
be derived from equation (33). It can be checked that for t ¸ 1 the unemployment rate









q +( 1¡q) u t ¡ 1
u t
+ µ 4 =0 ; (37)









q +( 1¡q) u t ¡ 1
u t
+ µ 4 =0 ; (38)
with the full basic income scheme. In these expressions,
µ1 = ¯(1 ¡ q);µ 12 ]0;1[;
µ2 =1 + »z(1 + º);µ 2>1 ;











Let Fj(ut¡1;u t;u t+1)=0( j=1 ;2) denote respectively the second-order scalar nonlin-
ear di®erence equations (37) and (38). Let us linearize Fj(ut¡1;u t;u t+1) = 0 around the
steady state uj¤ (de¯ned in (34)). Remember that the steady state is de¯ned di®erently
whether »<1 (i.e. j =1 )o r»¸1 (i.e. j = 2). The linearized di®erence equation can be































k denotes the ¯rst-order partial derivative of Fj with respect to its kth argument.
The properties of dynamic system when ¸ 6=0








2 ( u j ¤ )=³ j +
q +( 1¡q) u j¤
( u j¤) 2 ;
F
j








(µ2 ¡ u2¤)(1 ¡ u2¤)
:
For j =1 ;2, since µ2 > 1a n dµ 32]0;1[ , it can be checked that ³j has the same sign as ¸.




2 ( u j ¤ )
F
j
3 ( u j ¤ )
=1 +
q +( 1¡q) u j¤




1 ( u j ¤ )
F
j
3 ( u j ¤ )
=
1 ¡ q
³ j u j ¤ ; with sgn(detAj)=sgn(³j):
With one predetermined variable, the saddle point property is required in order to have
a unique nonexploding solution. This property is guaranteed if (trAj)2 ¡ 4(detAj) > 0
a n di f[ P j (1) < 0a n dP j( ¡ 1) > 0] or [Pj(1) > 0a n dP j( ¡ 1) < 0]. Let us check these
conditions. First, (trAj)2 ¡ 4(detAj) is always positive if ³j is negative. When ³j > 0,











³ j( u j¤) 2 +
1¡q
³ ju j¤ ¡2
¶
> 0 : (41)
There is no proof that this condition is always satis¯ed. Yet, numerical simulations show
that it is veri¯ed if 0:01 <q<0 : 4a n d0·u j ¤·1. Since this sub-space covers the range
of plausible values, condition (41) should be considered as ful¯lled.
Let us now turn to the second set of conditions. Carrying out the calculation yields
Pj(1) = ¡
q
³j(uj¤)2; with sgn[Pj(1)] = ¡sgn[³j];
Pj(¡1 )=1 + trAj + detAj =2+
q+2 ( 1¡q) u j¤
³ j( u j¤) 2 :
When ¸>0, it is easily seen that Pj(1) < 0a n dP j( ¡ 1) > 0. Put another way, the
linearized dynamic system (39) has the saddle point property. When ¸<0, Pj(1) is
positive but Pj(¡1) is not necessarily negative. Yet, unreported numerical simulations
show that uj¤ sharply decreases for ¸<0, so that the sign of Pj(¡1) turns out to be
negative for plausible values of the parameters. The saddle point property holds here, too.
27Appendix 2
This appendix checks whether the equilibrium unemployment rate u 2 ]0;1[. Next, it
proves result 1.
The equilibrium unemployment rate is bounded between zero and one









> (1 ¡ ¯)(1 ¡ q):
Whatever the sign of ¸, the left-hand side is positive. Unreported numerical simulations










> 1¡¯(1 ¡ q):
This inequality is satis¯ed according to unreported numerical simulations (again for plau-
sible values of the parameters).
The proof of result 1





















































The last property cannot be shown analytically. Yet, an unreported numerical analysis
shows that it is veri¯ed for plausible values of the parameters. Finally, relative risk aversion
























again on the basis of a numerical simulation.
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The effect of an increase in the full basic income.





































Figure 4: The equilibrium intertemporal utilities of an occupied worker Ve and an unem-
ployed Vu
34